gns3-server/docs/features/vxlan-cross-compute.md

Cross-compute VXLAN links

Overview

A link whose endpoints live on two different computes normally flows through the uBridge UDP relay: each end's anchor is attached to a userspace relay bridge and the frames cross the network as plain UDP payloads pumped by uBridge. This feature adds a second, kernel-native cross-compute datapath: each end creates a VXLAN device (uBridge's vxlan module, rtnetlink) and enslaves it into the same per-link kernel bridge the same-host datapath uses, so the kernel encapsulates and decapsulates and no userspace process is on the data path.

It is opt-in and off by default (Server.enable_vxlan_cross_compute). The reason is MTU: a tunnel can only carry what the underlay carries minus the outer headers, so its sweet spot is a fabric that moves jumbo frames. The relay stays the default cross-compute datapath and the fallback whenever a tunnel cannot be wired — it always works, at the price of a userspace hop.

Terms

Term	Meaning
Anchor	The host-side interface an adapter owns (a veth host end, a persistent TAP); links attach to it, never create it
Relay	The default cross-compute datapath: uBridge userspace bridges pumping UDP tunnels between the computes
Tunnel device	The per-end VXLAN device (gvl…) carrying one link's frames to the peer compute
VNI	The VXLAN network identifier — the kernel's demux key for received frames; both ends of a link must use the same one
dstport	The UDP port every tunnel of a deployment listens on; the kernel serves one socket per port and demuxes its traffic by VNI
Lower device	The underlay interface the route to the peer resolves to; the kernel derives the tunnel's MTU from it

Architecture

flowchart LR
    subgraph GA["guest A"]
        EA["eth0"]
    end
    subgraph CA["compute A"]
        AA["anchor"] --> BA["bridge"]
        BA --> VA["tunnel device"]
    end
    subgraph U["underlay"]
        UD["UDP to the peer, demuxed by VNI"]
    end
    subgraph CB["compute B"]
        VB["tunnel device"] --> BB["bridge"]
        BB --> AB["anchor"]
    end
    subgraph GB["guest B"]
        EB["eth0"]
    end
    EA --> AA
    VA --> UD
    UD --> VB
    AB --> EB

Everything on the anchor side is shared with the same-host kernel datapath: filters (the full tc surface including the netem extensions the relay cannot run), markers, capture and suspend all run on the anchor, so they behave identically on a tunneled link. The controller picks the VNI and the device names and hands the peer's address to each end; the kernel does the rest. The device names are a pure function of the link id (bridge, gvl device) and the endpoint's node id (device), so each machine can recognise its own leftovers without asking anyone.

Datapath selection

The controller's UDPLink._kernel_datapath_eligible decides at NIO prepare time, on every link (re)creation:

Condition	Outcome
Both endpoints on one compute, both able to anchor	Kernel link (per-link bridge, unchanged)
Cross-compute, enable_vxlan_cross_compute on, both computes report ubridge_vxlan, both ends anchorable, addresses on a common subnet and distinct	VXLAN tunnel
Same-host pair (both computes resolve to one address)	Relay — the kernel keeps one socket per dstport, so a tunnel pair collides with itself on one host
Ethernet switch on either end (cross-compute), serial / non-Ethernet ports, unix-socket vendor containers	Relay
Capability missing, flag off, or the link was already downgraded	Relay

On project (re)open every link re-runs the same decision, so flipping the flag upgrades or downgrades links the same way the same-host datapath is chosen.

Link creation

Each end's compute owns its own machine: it resolves the lower device from the peer address locally (a connected UDP socket picks the route without sending anything), creates the device and enslaves it. The two sides never talk to each other; the controller's VNI is what makes them a pair.

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Controller
    participant UA as Compute A uBridge
    participant UB as Compute B uBridge
    C->>UA: NIO: bridge, VNI, dstport, peer address
    C->>UB: NIO: bridge, VNI, dstport, peer address
    par compute A
        UA->>UA: vxlan show, delete a leftover
        UA->>UA: vxlan create with the local lower device
        UA->>UA: brctl addif bridge anchor, tunnel
    and compute B
        UB->>UB: vxlan show, delete a leftover
        UB->>UB: vxlan create with the local lower device
        UB->>UB: brctl addif bridge anchor, tunnel
    end
    Note over C: a refused create retries with a fresh VNI, then degrades the link to the relay

The vxlan show step is the idempotency contract: a device found under the link's deterministic name belongs to this link (a crashed run's leftover, the previous instance of a node restart) and is replaced, never refused. A create that fails with the name free can only be the VNI — the kernel refuses one already registered on the shared socket — so the controller bumps the derivation salt and retries, and after the retries run out it marks the link downgraded and rebuilds it on the relay. The same shape covers project open: a refused entry is reported per link by the batch route, retried on fresh VNIs up to the same candidate count an interactive creation gets, then degraded, so a VNI collision can never make a project unopenable. And a link wired while its nodes were stopped meets its collision only at node start — the controller's Node.start recognises the refused device (its name names the link), stops the half-started node, re-wires the link on a fresh VNI or, on a second refusal, degrades it to the relay, and retries: no path can fail permanently over a VNI.

Interfaces

Interface	Where	Notes
nio_bridge.vxlan (name, vni, remote, dstport)	Compute API, NIO create/update body	Present only on cross-compute kernel links; ignored by update (the device persists)
ubridge_vxlan	GET /capabilities and GET /computes/{id}	Probed with a scratch create/delete on a scratch port; null (unknown) keeps links on the relay
kernel_datapath	Link REST payload	True for tunneled links, like any kernel link

Configuration

Key	Default	Meaning
Server.enable_vxlan_cross_compute	false	Wire eligible cross-compute links as VXLAN tunnels
Server.vxlan_dstport	14789	The UDP port all tunnels of the deployment listen on (one kernel socket per port; chosen off the IANA 4789 and the legacy 8472 so other VXLAN software cannot merge demux tables with ours)

Known caveats

• MTU is the whole story. The kernel derives the tunnel device's MTU from the lower device (underlay − 50 for the outer headers; − 70 for an IPv6 underlay) and the per-link bridge, which carries no MTU of its own, reports the minimum of its ports — i.e. the derived value. A frame past it is dropped at the bridge egress silently (no ICMP, no log), which is why the datapath is opt-in: on a 1500-byte fabric a tunnel caps guests at 1450 while the relay carries 1500 with no tax. Guests set their own interface MTU, exactly like a VM or container raising eth0 on the same-host datapath.
• Asymmetric underlays give one-way jumbo. The derivation is per machine: a 9000-MTU compute paired with a 1500-MTU one forwards large frames in one direction only. Keep the fabric's MTU uniform between computes.
• The MTU is derived once, at device creation. Changing the underlay's MTU does not follow; a link delete/re-create (or project reopen) re-derives.
• VNI collisions self-heal, not never happen. The VNI is drawn from the upper VNI space (1M–16.7M) but two links of one deployment can still collide on a host. Every path where the kernel's refusal can surface carries its own heal: link creation retries a fresh VNI then degrades to the relay, project open re-dispatches refused entries the same way, and node start (a link wired while its nodes were stopped) stops the half-started node, re-wires the link on a fresh VNI or degrades it on a second refusal, and retries the start. A reopen re-rolls every link's VNI, so an unlucky link is not permanently unlucky.
• Security is the relay's, unchanged. VXLAN carries no authentication; the VNI and the shared port are the only demux, and anyone who can reach the port can inject into any VNI. Treat the compute fabric as trusted, exactly as for the relay's UDP tunnels.
• Same-host compute pairs stay on the relay, as do switch links, serial ports and unix-socket vendor containers — the tunnel is a per-link-bridge shape, and those cases are not (or would collide with themselves on one host).

Verification

• Unit: tests/controller/test_kernel_datapath_link.py (selection matrix, tunnel spec derivation, VNI retry, downgrade), tests/utils/test_vxlan.py, tests/compute/docker/test_docker_kernel_datapath.py (device lifecycle, leftover replacement, teardown ordering), tests/api/routes/compute/test_capabilities.py.
• Live: tests/e2e/test_vxlan_cross_compute.py — two computes on one machine (a network namespace joined to the host by a veth pair as the second "machine"), real containers per compute: VNI/port agreement, bridge membership, the derived MTU and its hard egress drop, dual-stack traffic, a delay filter, leftover replacement, a VNI squatted at node start (both ends re-wired on a fresh VNI, the start succeeding), residue-free delete and a rebuild through the project-open batch path.

Roadmap

• PMTU probing between computes to pick the datapath (and pin the MTU) per pair instead of a deployment-wide flag.
• Ethernet switch links tunneled through the switch's own bridge (the absorbed-anchor shape) instead of falling back to the relay.
• VNI-space bookkeeping to make collisions impossible by construction rather than self-healing.